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LEGAL CAPACITY AND PARTICIPATION IN LITIGATION: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Lucy Series1 
ABSTRACT 
The right to equal recognition before the law lies at the core of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The right to 
litigate in order to claim and defend one’s rights is vital if they are to have any 
enforceable application. Yet people who are deprived of their legal capacity 
often experience multiple barriers to litigating in defense of their rights. These 
barriers range from formal bars against making applications to the courts or 
instructing their own legal representative, to judicial practices which exclude 
people with disabilities from proceedings which concern their own lives and 
affairs. Legal capacity, as protected by Article 12 CRPD, thus intersects in 
important ways with Article 13 CRPD on access to justice. There is, 
furthermore, a need to consider what kinds of supports and accommodations 
people with disabilities – especially intellectual, cognitive and psychosocial 
disabilities, which I will refer to collectively as ‘mental disabilities’2 – would 
need to enable them to participate in litigation effectively and fairly. In recent 
years, the European Court of Human Rights has heard a succession of cases 
that have significantly developed its interpretation of Articles 5(4), 6, 8 and 13 
of the European Convention (ECHR) on Human Rights in relation to legal 
capacity. This article reviews how far we have come, and how far we have yet 
to go, for the Strasbourg court to develop a jurisprudence that reflects the 
spirit and purpose of Articles 12 and 13 CRPD in connection with procedural 
justice. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As the European Court of Human Rights noted in Golder v UK3 one can 
‘scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having 
access to the courts’. The Court’s insight in Golder v UK has profound 
                                                          
1
 Research Associate, Cardiff Law School (email: SeriesL@Cardiff.ac.uk).  This article has 
been subject to independent and anonymous peer review. 
2
 As the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights commented in its recent report on 
legal capacity, there is a lack of consensus about preferred terminology – particularly in 
relation to ‘psychosocial disabilities’, as some prefer the term ‘mental health problems’ and 
prefer not to identify as disabled.  This article refers to ‘disabilities’, however, to orient readers 
towards barriers and supports within the legal system, and to highlight the engagement of the 
CRPD. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2013) Legal capacity of 
persons with intellectual disabilities and persons with mental health problems. Brussels. 
3
 Application No. 4451/70, judgment 21 February 1975, (1975) ECHR 1; 1 EHRR 524, §34. 
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implications: those who do not have access to a court exist in a realm beyond 
the rule of law; a world with few effective brakes against unprincipled and 
unlawful incursions into one’s rights. Yet for many people across the Member 
States of the Council of Europe, access to the courts is nigh on impossible as 
a result of their being deprived of their legal capacity on disability-related 
grounds. The ability to exercise one’s legal capacity – backed up by the ability 
to litigate if need be – is central to the exercise of all other legal rights. It is for 
this reason that Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) – the right to equal recognition before the law – is said to 
lie at the ‘core’ of the Convention.4  As the European Court of Human Rights 
itself observed in the landmark legal capacity case Stanev v Bulgaria,5 loss of 
legal capacity will be decisive for the exercise of all the rights and freedoms 
affected by the declaration of incapacity. 
The right to equal recognition before the law provoked intense debate during 
the drafting of the CRPD,6 and is said to have caused the most problems for 
States in ratifying it.7 At root, these debates concerned whether or not it is 
ever acceptable to impose a substituted decision for a person’s own will and 
preferences on disability related grounds. The text of Article 12 does retain 
some language which might appear to permit substituted decision making,8 
but the United Nations Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CPRD Committee) has consistently interpreted Article 12 as requiring States 
to ‘take action to develop laws and policies to replace regimes of substitute 
decision-making by supported decision-making’.9   
                                                          
4
 Centre for Disability Law & Policy, ‘Submission on Legal Capacity to the Oireachtas 
Committee on Justice, Defence & Equality’, (NUI Galway, 2011), 5.  See also: A. Lawson, 
‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: New era or false 
dawn?’, 563 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (2006-7), 596. 
5
 Stanev v Bulgaria, Application No. 36760/06, judgment 17 January 2012, (2012) 55 EHRR 
22, § 241. 
6
 Lawson, 563 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (2006-7); A. Dhanda, 
‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for 
the Future’, 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (2006-7), 429; T. 
Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the 
right to be free from non consensual psychiatric interventions’, 34Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce (2006-7), 405. 
7
 Equal Rights Trust, ‘Promoting a Paradigm Shift – ERT talks with Gábor Gombos and 
Gerard Quinn about the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its 
Optional Protocol’, 2 The Equal Rights Review (2008), 83. 
8
 A. Dhanda, 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (2006-7); D. Lush, 
‘Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, 1 
Elder Law Journal (2011), 61. 
9
 United Nations Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding 
observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Tunisia, Fifth 
Session: 11-15 April 2011, (Geneva, 2011).  CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1. See also reports on Spain 
(CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1), Hungary (CRPD/C/HUN/CO/1), Peru (CRPD/C/PER/CO/1), Argentina 
(CRPD/C/ARG/CO/1), China (CRPD/C/CHN/CO/1), Paraguay (CRPD/C/PRY/CO/1) and 
Austria (CRPD/C/AUT/CO/1). 
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Article 12(3) CRPD requires States to ‘take appropriate measures to provide 
access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity’. A growing literature considers what such 
supports might look like. 10  Questions remain about what the ‘support 
paradigm’ might look like in situations of crisis or emergencies,11 and models 
of supported decision-making are lacking in many fields.12 Yet the need for 
further development of a support paradigm does not diminish the importance 
of the CRPD’s loud and clear call for a new approach to the rights of persons 
with disabilities. 
Article 12 CRPD is bolstered by Article 13 CRPD, which requires that States 
ensure that people with disabilities enjoy equal access to justice with others 
through provision of appropriate accommodations in order to ‘facilitate their 
effective role as direct and indirect participants’.  Article 13 also requires 
States to promote appropriate training for those working in the administration 
of justice.   
Until recently, the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on legal 
capacity was deeply underdeveloped. This is mostly likely to be due to the 
well known difficulties that people with disabilities experience in accessing 
justice in general – especially those who are formally barred from litigation as 
a result of deprivation of their legal capacity.13 The Court’s former President, 
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 Advocacy for Inclusion, ‘Supported Decision Making, Legal Capacity and Guardianship: 
Implementing Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the 
Australian Capital Territory’, (Canberra City, 2012); M. Bach, & L. Kerzner, ‘A New Paradigm 
for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity: Prepared for the Law Commission 
of Ontario’, (Ontario, 2010); Centre for Disability Law & Policy, Submission on Legal Capacity 
to the Oireachtas Committee on Justice, Defence & Equality; R.D. Dinerstein, ‘Implementing 
Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: The Difficult Road From Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making’, 19 Human 
rights Brief (2012), 8; European Disability Forum, ‘Equal recognition before the law and equal 
capacity to act: understanding and implementing Article 12 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, (EDF Position paper – Brussels, 2009) ; P. Gooding, 
‘Supported Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and its Implications for 
Mental Health Law’, 20(3) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (2012), 431; Inclusion Europe, 
‘Key Elements of a System for Supported Decision-Making’, (Position Paper of Inclusion 
Europe, Adopted at the General Assembly 2008). 
11
 P. Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Mental Health Law’, 75 Medical Law Review (2012), 752; P. Gooding, Psychiatry, Psychology 
and Law (2012); G. Richardson, ‘Mental capacity in the shadow of suicide: What can the law 
do?’, 9 International Journal of Law in Context (2013), 87. 
12
 S. Werner, ‘Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities: A Review of the Literature on Decision-
Making since the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD)’, 34 Public 
Health Reviews (2012), 1. 
13
 See, for example, P. Bartlett, O. Lewis, & O. Therold, Mental Disability and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 153; Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, Promoting the Safety and Security of Disabled People, (London, 2010); 
S. Ortoleva, ‘Inaccessible Justice: Human Rights, Persons with Disabilities and the Legal 
System Disability-Inclusive Development’, 17 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative 
Law (2010-11), 281. 
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Sir Nicolas Bratza, has lamented that he had hoped the ruling in Winterwerp v 
the Netherlands,14 ‘would lead to a flowering of the Court’s case-law on the 
Convention rights of persons with mental disabilities, the contrary proved to 
be the case: the jurisprudence of the Court in the succeeding twenty years is 
notable for the almost complete dearth of judicial decisions in this vitally 
important area’.15  Happily, the last five years have begun to show signs of a 
delayed flowering of legal capacity jurisprudence in the European Court of 
Human Rights, in part as a result of the concerted efforts of European 
NGOs. 16  However, although there have been several important 
developments, the case law discussed below still falls far short of the 
substantive rights contained within Article 12 CRPD – and elements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) itself, cannot in any case be 
reconciled to the CRPD.17 
The topic of legal capacity is broad and intersects in complex ways with 
almost all legal rights and processes. This article limits its ambitions to review 
recent developments from the European Court of Human Rights in the area of 
legal capacity and procedural justice. It considers how recent rulings under 
the ECHR have a bearing on such fundamental procedural matters as a 
person’s standing to apply to a court, to instruct their own lawyer, to be 
notified of legal proceedings which are about them, to appear in person and 
meet the judge deciding their case, and to be informed of the outcome of the 
court’s decision. These technical procedural issues lurk in the background of 
highly charged debates about rights to exercise one’s legal capacity in relation 
to more substantive matter – such as rights to refuse medical treatments, to 
decide where one lives, to marry, to vote, etc.  Yet they cannot be neglected, 
as without the ability to litigate effectively, the rights and protections afforded 
by legal capacity will be weak. 
This paper starts by briefly reviewing the diversity of ways in which a person’s 
procedural rights might be impacted upon by a denial of legal capacity, and 
some of the justifications given for this. It explains how these issues can arise 
not only in connection with traditional guardianship regimes, but also in 
jurisdictions which purport to have more ‘empowering’ capacity regimes. Part 
three considers the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence regarding the right of 
access to a court. Part four considers the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
participation of persons deprived of their legal capacity in the proceedings 
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 Application No. 6301/73, judgment 24 October 1979, (1979) 2 EHRR 387. 
15
 Foreword to Bartlett, Lewis and Thorold’s book Mental disability and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (2007). 
16
 In particular: the Mental Disability Advocacy Center, the International Centre for Legal 
Protection of Human Rights (Interights) and regional Helsinki Committees. 
17
 P. Fennell & U. Khaliq, 'Conflicting or complementary obligations? The UN Disability Rights 
Convention on Human Rights and English law' 6 European Human Rights Law Review (2011) 
662. 
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themselves. Part five considers a very underdeveloped area of Strasbourg 
case law – an area ripe for creative litigation – the right to support in the 
exercise of legal capacity during litigation. This article closes with a discussion 
of how these procedural matters might impact on wider reforms relating to 
deprivation of legal capacity.  
2. DEPRIVATION OF CAPACITY AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
Many jurisdictions operate systems of plenary or partial guardianship where 
all, or some, of a person’s ordinary legal rights to self-determination are 
vested in a third party – their guardian. Research by NGOs and 
intergovernmental organizations has revealed the inner workings of such 
regimes for a number of Central and Eastern European states. 18  This 
research shows that in many States a person who is formally deprived of their 
legal capacity will be legally barred from making applications to the courts, 
even for the purpose of restoring their legal capacity. The Strasbourg court 
has increasingly found that this state of affairs violates fundamental ECHR 
rights, discussed in more detail below. 
Earlier international human rights standards, now supplanted by the CRPD, 
had called for States to take a more tailored approach to deprivation of legal 
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 Please note that some of these jurisdictions may have undergone law reform since these 
reports were published: Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, ‘Guardianship and Human Rights 
in Serbia: Analysis of Guardianship Law and Policy’, (Budapest, 2006); Mental Disability 
Advocacy Centre, ‘Guardianship and Human Rights in Bulgaria: Analysis of Law, Policy and 
Practice’, (Budapest, 2007); Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, ‘Guardianship and Human 
Rights in Russia: Analysis of Law, Policy and Practice’, (Budapest, 2007); Mental Disability 
Advocacy Centre, ‘Guardianship and Human Rights in Hungary: Analysis of Law, Policy and 
Practice’, (Budapest, 2007); Mental Disability Advocacy Centre Guardianship and Human 
Rights in the ‘Czech Republic: Analysis of Law, Policy and Practice’, (Budapest, 2007); 
Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, ‘Guardianship and Human Rights in Kyrgyzstan: Analysis 
of Law, Policy and Practice’, (Budapest, 2007). For more recent, but less detailed, analyses 
of guardianship laws see also: Mental Disability Advocacy Center & SHINE, ‘Out of Sight: 
Human Rights in Psychiatric Hospitals and Social Care Institutions in Croatia’, (Hungary and 
Zagreb, 2011); L. ̌Imokovic, S. Cano, D. Halugic, N. Nadarevic, A. Biberkic, V. Zaimovic, V. 
Behluli, Z. Hyseni-Duraku, S.A. Lazarevic, & D.C. Milovanovic, ‘Practicing Universality of 
Rights: Analysis of the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities in view of Persons with intellectual Disabilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Serbia’, (People in Need, 2012); L. Ciocan, ‘Study: The System of Guardianship in 
Practice in the Republic of Moldova: Human Rights and Vulnerability of Persons Declared 
Incapacitated’, (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013); 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center, ‘Written Comments to the Human Rights Committee on 
the List of Issues Bulgaria Review’, (Budapest, 2011); Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 
‘Additional information about Hungary’s compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, with respect to the List of Issues and Replies from the Government 
of Hungary to the List of issues’, (Budapest, 2012).  For recent changes in the Czech 
Republic see: Mental Disability Advocacy Center, ‘Czech Republic enacts legal capacity law 
reform’, (Budapest, 2012), available at: <http://mdac.info/en/news/czech-republic-enacts-
legal-capacity-law-reform> (accessed 25 October 2013). 
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capacity.19 Accordingly, some more modern guardianship regimes adopt a 
‘functional’ approach, whereby a person’s legal capacity is coupled to their 
‘mental capacity’ – as defined under a ‘functional’ test. One such regime is the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 of England and Wales (MCA). 20  Typically, 
functional approaches like the MCA assess how well a person understands 
the information relevant to a particular decision, evaluates that information, 
retains it and communicates their decision. 21  Because a person’s 
performance in relation to the functional test will vary according to the 
decision in question, a person’s legal capacity is said to be ‘decision specific’ 
– this is supposed to tailor any deprivation of legal capacity to the minimum a 
person is said to need. Although it is beyond the scope of this article, there 
are many compelling critiques of ‘functional approaches’ to legal capacity, 22 
and it is unlikely to accord with the most recent jurisprudence of the CRPD 
Committee23 as it still permits substituted decision making.    
Of particular significance for this discussion, functional approaches like the 
MCA may still impact upon a person’s procedural rights in litigation, but they 
may do so in a slightly different way to plenary or partial guardianship.  
Because a person’s legal capacity will depend upon their ‘functional capacity’ 
in relation to a particular matter, in theory a person with a ‘guardian’24 might 
                                                          
19
 United Nations, ‘The protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of 
mental health care’, signed at the 75th plenary meeting of the UN General assembly, 
A/RES/46/119 (MI Principles); Council of Europe, Recommendation (99) 4E on principles 
concerning the legal protection of incapable adults, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 
23 February 1999. 
20
 This example is among the best known, but see also: Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
2000; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Queensland, Australia); Adult Guardianship 
and Trusteeship Act 2008 (Alberta, Canada); Substitute Decisions Act 1992 (Ontario, 
Canada). Some jurisdictions have specific functional tests for particular decisions, for 
example the Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Victoria, Australia) has a specific test 
for making medical decisions. In British Columbia, Canada, there are different tests for the 
capacity to make a Representation Agreement (Representation Agreement Act (British 
Columbia) 1996) to the capacity to make a Power of Attorney (Power of Attorney Act 1996 
(British Columbia)).  
21
 See Sections 1-3 Mental Capacity Act 2005 for details of this functional test.  
22
 O. Lewis, European Human Rights Law Review (2011), 700; A. Dhanda, 34 Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce (2996-7), 429; S. Stefan, ‘Silencing the Different 
Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law’, 47 Miami Law Review (1992-1993), 763; D. 
Morgan, D. & K. Veitch, ‘Being Ms B: B, Autonomy and the Nature of Legal Regulation’, 26 
Sydney Law Review (2004), 107; F. Freyenhagen, & T. O'Shea, ‘Hidden Substance: Mental 
disorder as a challenge to normatively neutral accounts of autonomy’, 9 International Journal 
of Law in Context (2013), 53. 
23
 See footnote 9, above, and United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2013) Draft General comment on Article 12 of the Convention-Equal Recognition 
before the Law. (Adopted by the Committee at its tenth session, 2 – 13 September 2013). 
Geneva. 
24
 I use the term ‘guardian’ here to signify a third party who is appointed to make decisions on 
behalf of a person who lacks legal capacity. However, the term has a different significance in 
England and Wales, where ‘guardianship’ is a little used relic of a much older regime under 
ss6-7 Mental Health Act 1983 which gives them extremely limited powers. More commonly, 
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retain their legal capacity to litigate independently of their guardian’s consent 
if it is felt that they have the ‘mental capacity’ to do so.25 Conversely, a person 
without any formally appointed ‘guardian’ might be deprived of the legal 
capacity to conduct proceedings if the Court finds that they lack the ‘mental 
capacity’ to conduct the litigation.26 Under functional approaches, the capacity 
to litigate is therefore distinct from a person’s legal capacity in relation to other 
areas, but it may still have a profound impact on the way they can conduct 
litigation to enforce their rights. 
2.1. RATIONALE FOR RESTRICTIONS ON LITIGATION CAPACITY 
The European Court of Human Rights has delineated a threefold rationale for 
restrictions on a person’s capacity to litigate: to protect the person 
themselves, to protect the courts and to protect other litigants. In Salontaji-
Drobnjak v Serbia the Court stated that ‘a legal system must be allowed to 
protect itself from vexatious litigants’. 27  In Mikhaylenko v Ukraine the 
European Court acknowledged ‘that restrictions on the procedural rights of a 
person who has been deprived of legal capacity may be justified for that 
person’s own protection, the protection of the interests of others and the 
proper administration of justice’. 28  In relation to protecting the person 
themselves, in Zehentner v Austria the European Court did distinguish 
between procedural restrictions that ‘protect the person concerned from 
disposing of his or her rights or assets to their own disadvantage’ and 
proceedings under the European Convention where ‘the need for a person 
lacking legal capacity to be represented by a guardian is less obvious’.29 This 
suggests that when it comes to conducting litigation concerning fundamental 
rights, which does not have the potential for the disadvantageous disposal of 
a person’s property, it may be harder for States to justify restrictions on legal 
capacity under the ECHR. 
From the perspective of equal recognition before the law under the CRPD, it 
is questionable why people with disabilities should be subject to specific 
restrictions on access to a court, when most legal systems also operate 
general protective mechanisms against vexatious litigants. In the domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the Court of Protection might appoint a ‘deputy’ to make decisions on behalf of a person in 
accordance with their ‘mental capacity’ and ‘best interests’, who play a role comparable to 
partial guardians in other jurisdictions.   
25
 See, for example, the UK case V v R [2011] EWHC 822 (QB). 
26
 For example, see the UK case RP v Nottingham City Council & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 
462, discussed below. 
27
 Application No. 36500/05, judgment 13 October 2009, (2009) ECHR 1526, § 143. 
28
 Mikhaylenko v Ukraine, Application No. 49069/11, judgment 30 May 2013, (2013) ECHR 
484, § 35. 
29
 Zehentner v Austria, Application No. 20082/02, judgment 16 July 2009, (2009) ECHR 1119, 
§39. 
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hearing of the ECHR case Seal v UK,30 Lady Hale emphasized that there is 
no necessary relationship between mental disability and bringing vexatious 
claims. Disappointingly in Seal v UK, the European Court never grappled with 
the discriminatory nature of imposing additional procedural bars on access to 
a court for people with mental disabilities, because the discrimination 
arguments had not been raised in domestic proceedings.31 
3. ACCESS TO A COURT 
Where persons who have been deprived of their legal capacity have no 
standing to initiate litigation independently of their guardian, courts may refuse 
to even examine their application.32 In Golder v UK the Strasbourg Court held 
that the right of access to a court ‘constitutes an element which is inherent in 
the right stated by Article 6’ ECHR. 33  However, subsequent cases have 
confirmed that the right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6 (on the 
right to a fair trial) is not absolute, especially for people with mental 
disabilities.   
General jurisprudence on rights of access to a court 
Article 6 does not require a judicial remedy to exist for any human rights claim 
– this requirement would fall to other articles of the ECHR, in conjunction with 
Article 13 – the right to an effective remedy. This means that Article 6 
guarantees access to a court only where a person already has an arguable 
case under domestic law. In Fayed v the United Kingdom 34  the Court 
distinguished between substantive and procedural limitations on the right of 
access to a court. Where domestic law provided no substantive legal right to 
be asserted before a court the Article 6 right of access was not engaged, but it 
would be where the bar on access to a court was procedural. The Court 
highlighted the difficulty that it is ‘not always an easy matter to trace the 
dividing line between procedural and substantive limitations of a given 
entitlement under domestic law’.35   Generally speaking, a lack of standing to 
bring a case resulting from restrictions on legal capacity has been treated as a 
procedural bar, and so falls within the remit of Article 6 protections.  
                                                          
30
 Seal v United Kingdom, Application no 50330/07, judgment 07 December 2010, (2012) 54 
EHRR 6, § 26. 
31
 K. Gledhill, ‘Seal v UK: The end of the story or time for a fresh beginning?’, 21 Journal of 
Mental Health Law (2011), 93. 
32
 See, e.g. Shtukaturov v Russia; Salontaji-Drobnjak v Serbia; Stanev v Bulgaria; D.D. v 
Lithuania; Kędzior v Poland. 
33Golder v UK, §34 and 36.  
34Application No. 17101/90, judgment 21 September 1994, (1994) 18 EHRR 393. 
35
 §67; for further discussion of this issue see Z and Others v United Kingdom, Application 
No. 29392/95, judgment 10 May 2001, (2002) 34 EHRR 3, §100-103; Roche v The United 
Kingdom, Application No. 32555/96, judgment 19 October 2005, (2005) 42 EHRR 30, §118-
120. 
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Nevertheless, the procedural rights of access to a court under Article 6 for 
those whom the European Court refers to as persons ‘of unsound mind’36 are 
subject to limitations that have been endorsed by the European Court. 
LiŵitatioŶs oŶ rights of aĐĐess to a Đourt for persoŶs ͚of uŶsouŶd ŵiŶd͛ 
In Golder v UK the Court had hesitated to rule in abstracto on whether 
restrictions on access to the court for people ‘of unsound mind’ were 
compatible with Article 6.37 In Winterwerp v The Netherlands it concluded that 
whilst ‘mental illness may render legitimate certain limitations upon the 
exercise of the "right to a court", it cannot warrant the total absence of that 
right’. 38  In Ashingdane v United Kingdom 39  the Court considered the 
requirement that patients detained under the Mental Health Act40 must first 
seek the permission of a court before bringing proceedings connected with 
their detention. The Strasbourg Court found that access to a court to seek 
permission to bring proceedings was adequate access for the purposes of 
Article 6 ECHR.41  
A large body of ECHR case law has accepted that rights of access to a court 
may be subject to limitations for person ‘of unsound mind’ so long as these 
did not impair the very ‘essence’ of the right.42 The Court stated that such 
limitations must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim and there must be ‘a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be achieved’. 43  The Court has held that in assessing 
whether a particular measure restricting access to court is necessary, all 
relevant factors must be considered. 44  States are afforded a reasonable 
margin of appreciation to determine procedures limiting rights of access to a 
court45 although, ‘if the procedure was seriously deficient in some respect, the 
conclusions of the domestic authorities are more open to criticism’.46 In more 
recent cases, the Court has held that the margin of appreciation was 
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 Being of ‘unsound mind’ is an explicit limitation on the right to liberty under Article 5(1)(e) 
ECHR, but it is also sometimes used in the Court’s jurisprudence in relation to other ECRH 






 Application No. 8225/78, judgment 28 May 1985, (1985) 7 EHRR 528. 
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 Z and Others v United Kingdom, Application No. 29392/95, judgment 10 May 2001, (2002) 
34 EHRR 3, §93; Shtukaturov v Russia, Application No. 44009/05, judgment 27 March 2008, 
(2012) 54 EHRR 27, §68; Salontaji-Drobnjak v Serbia, §133; Seal v United Kingdom, 
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 Seal v UK, §75. 
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 Shtukaturov v Russia, §68. 
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 Ashingdane v UK, §57; Seal v UK, §75; Stanev v Bulgaria, §229, 241; RP v UK, §65. 
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significantly narrowed ‘where the measure under examination has such a 
drastic effect on the applicant’s personal autonomy’ as to constitute a 
deprivation of legal capacity.47 
 
Essential rights of direct access to a court for persons deprived of their legal capacity 
The Court has now elaborated at least three circumstances where a person 
who is deprived of their legal capacity must have direct access to a court, 
without limitation. In Shtukaturov v Russia,48 Sýkora v The Czech Republic,49 
Kędzior v Poland50 and Mihailovs v Latvia51 the Court has confirmed that a 
person must have standing to apply to a court to appeal against a deprivation 
of their liberty, regardless of whether their guardian consents to such an 
action. In Shtukaturov v Russia the Court asserted that deprivation of legal 
capacity is as important an issue under the ECHR as deprivation of liberty,52  
and in Stanev v Bulgaria53, Kędzior v Poland54 and Mikhaylenko v Ukraine55  
the Court held that Article 6 ECHR must be interpreted as ‘guaranteeing a 
person, in principle, direct access to a court to seek restoration of his or her 
legal capacity’.56 In Berková v Slovakia57 the Court held that a restriction on a 
person’s right to apply for restoration of their legal capacity of three years in 
duration was disproportionate and violated Article 8 ECHR (on right to respect 
for private and family life).58 The Court has also held that where a person is in 
conflict with their guardian, and ‘when the conflict potential has a major impact 
on the person’s legal situation’ it is essential that the person concerned must 
have access to the court.59 
Developing frontiers in direct rights of access to a court for persons deprived of their legal capacity 
One developing frontier is the right to ask a court to review the lawfulness of 
an involuntary placement in an institution. For the millions of people with 
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 Lashin v Russia, Application no. 33117/02, judgment 22 January 2013, [2012] ECHR 63, 
§81.  See also: MS v Croatia, Application no 36337/10, judgment 25 April 2013, [2013] ECHR 
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 §71 and 90. 
53
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disabilities living in Europe’s residential institutions,60 this would be a very 
significant and important right. Increasingly, institutional placement is 
considered to be an unacceptable response to disability,61 in contravention of 
Article 19 CRPD – the right to independent living. Ensuring that people have 
the legal means to challenge institutional placement against their will is 
essential to helping to row back the tide of involuntary institutionalization of 
persons with disabilities. In Stanev v Bulgaria the Court held that it was not 
sufficient for Mr Stanev to have a theoretical opportunity to challenge his 
placement in a care facility if he could first restore his legal capacity, holding 
that there should have been a ‘direct review of the lawfulness of the 
applicant’s placement’.62  In essence, a person should be able to dislodge the 
placement decision of their guardian directly, without first having to dislodge 
the guardian themselves. 
Guardians, and informal substitute decision makers,63 can often consent to 
medical treatment. Although the Court’s recent ruling in X v Finland64 did not 
consider questions of legal capacity directly, it did find that forced 
administration of medication violated a person’s Article 8 rights where the 
decision making was ‘solely in the hands of the treating doctors’, was free of 
any kind of immediate judicial scrutiny and there was no available remedy 
where a court could be required to rule on the lawfulness and proportionality 
of such forced treatments and have it discontinued.65 It seems only a small 
step from this ruling to argue that people must have direct access to a court to 
rule on the lawfulness of medical treatments which are administered against 
their will, even where their guardian consents or medical practitioners might 
have a defence for such acts on the basis that the person ‘lacks capacity’.  Of 
course, these procedural rights are insufficient to bring the European 
Convention jurisprudence into compliance with Article 17 CRPD (protecting 
the integrity of the person), as the CRPD Committee has interpreted it as 
prohibiting forced treatment altogether.66   
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 J. Mansell, M. Knapp, J. Beadle-Brown, & J. Beecham, ‘Deinstitutionalisation and 
community living – outcomes and costs: Report of a European Study. Volume 2: Main Report, 
Report commissioned by the European Commission’, (University of Kent, 2007). 
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 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), ‘Involuntary placement and 
involuntary treatment of persons with mental health problems’, (Vienna, 2012); C. Parker, 
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 §177, see also §173. 
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 See the CRPD Committee’s reports on Tunisia, Spain and Peru. See also: J. E. Méndez, 
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In relation to other kinds of claims, the European Court has been content to 
find that access to a court that is conditional on the consent of a person’s 
guardian complies with Article 6, where there was no evidence of a conflict of 
interests between the person and their guardian.67 However, in relation to 
these core rights of access – to challenge deprivation of liberty, deprivation of 
legal capacity or where there is a dispute between a person and their 
guardian - the Court has held that the ability to enlist one’s guardian, or a 
public figure such as a mayor or prosecutor, to apply to court on behalf of 
people deprived of legal capacity is insufficient.68 In X and Y v Croatia the 
Court held that ‘[r]emedies the use of which depends on the discretionary 
powers of public officials and which are, as a consequence, not directly 
accessible to the applicant cannot be considered as effective remedies within 
the meaning of Article 35 §1 of the Convention’.69  More recently in MH v UK70 
the Court affirmed that ‘right of access to a court under Article 5 § 4 of the 
Convention should not depend upon the goodwill or initiative of a third party’. 
4. PARTICIPATION IN COURT PROCEEDINGS 
People who are deprived of legal capacity may face procedural obstacles in 
participating in litigation which concerns them. This is often linked to prejudice 
against people with mental disabilities, as this telling quotation from a 
Moldovan judge reveals: 
I think that the person’s participation is neither necessary nor 
useful because we speak about people who are mentally 
inadequate. They just would hinder the proper conduct of the 
trial. Do you think they might behave in a civilized manner in the 
courtroom? Their presence in the courtroom is not necessary; 
the relatives talk for them, while the conclusion is based on the 
report of the psychiatric expertise.71 
The European Court has found that where a case is not ‘highly technical’ or 
‘purely legal’, there must be an oral hearing and written proceedings will not 
suffice72  unless there are ‘exceptional circumstances’73 .  Where a person 
                                                                                                                                                                      
or punishment', 22nd session of the Human Rights Council, 4th March 2013, Geneva, 
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 L., Ciocan, ‘The System of Guardianship in Practice in the Republic of Moldova’, (2013), 
14. 
72
 Koottummel v Austria, Application No. 49616/06, judgment 10 December 2009 (2009) 
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waives their right to be present during a hearing, it must be exercised in an 
unequivocal manner and attended by ‘minimum safeguards commensurate to 
its importance’.74  Article 12(2) CRPD implies that these rights to participate 
personally during proceedings should apply to persons with disabilities on an 
equal basis with others, and Article 13 CRPD requires appropriate 
accommodations be made available to facilitate personal participation.  
However, in many cases concerning deprivation of legal capacity, people 
have been prevented from personally participating in the proceedings.  The 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center comments that where reliance is placed on 
medical opinion that a person should not participate in proceedings, the adult 
will have no opportunity to oppose such a finding and ‘it is all too easy to 
allege that an adult cannot understand the procedure.’75  This section reviews 
a number of ways in which people with mental disabilities may be excluded 
from fully participating in proceedings that affect them, or from participating on 
an equal basis with others, and the European Court’s response. 
4.1. THE RIGHT TO BE NOTIFIED 
Notification of court proceedings is an essential precursor to participation. 
Without this individuals will not even be aware of their occurrence and will be 
denied any opportunity to oppose any measures which impact upon their 
rights.  However, procedures for deprivation of legal capacity in many 
countries permit courts to waive the right of the person in question to be 
notified of the proceedings.76 Even where people are notified of guardianship 
proceedings, their right to appear and participate in court may not be 
explained to them.77  In some jurisdictions, they may not even be made a 
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 Allan Jacobsson v Sweden (No. 2), Application No. 16970/90, judgment 19 February 1998, 
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party to proceedings, even though the case concerns them and their legal 
capacity.78 
The European Court has found that failure to notify individuals of deprivation 
of capacity proceedings violates fair trial guarantees. In Shtukaturov v Russia, 
a lack of evidence that Mr Shtukaturov was notified that his mother had 
initiated deprivation of legal capacity proceedings contributed to a finding of a 
violation of Article 6.79 In X and Y v Croatia the Strasbourg Court observed 
that failure to serve a decision divesting the applicant of her legal capacity 
upon her contributed to a violation of Article 680 as ‘she was therefore unable 
to use any remedies against it’.81  Notification therefore appears to be a core 
requirement of Article 6 ECHR in relation to deprivation of legal capacity 
proceedings. 
4.2. THE ‘RULE OF PERSONAL PRESENCE’ 
In its jurisprudence on general fair trial guarantees, the European Court’s rule 
of ‘personal presence’ requires that a person be present before proceedings 
whose purpose is to establish questions of fact which relate to that person.82  
Decisions based on emotional issues,83  and issues relating to a person’s 
health or character 84 , also require the person’s presence.  Clearly, 
proceedings concerning deprivation of liberty, deprivation of legal capacity 
and conflicts with guardians will involve questions of fact concerning that 
person - yet it is often that case that such proceedings occur in their 
absence.85  In a series of cases, most recently Lashin v Russia, the European 
Court has emphasized that this ‘rule of personal presence’ also applies for 
proceedings concerning people deprived of legal capacity. 86  There is, 
therefore, a strong presumption in favour of a person physically participating 
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in proceedings which concern his legal capacity, or at least having some 
personal contact with the judge deciding his case.   
In Shtukaturov v Russia the Court derived the rule of personal presence in 
legal capacity proceedings from the twin role of Mr Shtukaturov as both a 
subject and an ‘object’ of examination in the proceedings. As an ‘object’ of 
proceedings, the Court found that Mr Shtukaturov’s presence was required to 
allow the judge to have visual contact, question him and form his personal 
opinion about the applicant’s mental capacity, 87  especially given that Mr 
Shtukaturov had been ‘a relatively autonomous person’.  In X and Y v Croatia 
the Court rejected the view, expressed by the Moldovan judge cited above, 
that it is unnecessary for a judge to meet the person in question as the 
decision is based on a medical report. The Court noted that it is ultimately for 
the judge – not a physician or a psychiatrist – to assess the relevant facts and 
draw conclusions about legal capacity, 88 and held that: 
[. . .] judges adopting decisions with serious consequences for a 
person’s private life, such as those entailed by divesting 
someone of legal capacity, should in principle also have 
personal contact with those persons.89 
In several cases the Strasbourg Court itself has shown itself willing to criticize 
the quality of medical evidence used in domestic legal capacity cases, even 
though the Court does not ordinarily involve itself in findings of fact from first 
instance courts.90 
The rule of personal presence is also derived from a person’s role as a 
contesting subject in proceedings. In Shtukaturov v Russia the Court 
concluded that it was in breach of the principle of adversarial proceedings 
enshrined in Article 6(1) to decide the case on the basis of documentary 
evidence, without seeing or hearing the applicant; 91  his participation was 
necessary ‘to enable him to present his own case’.92 In Salontaji-Drobnjak v 
Serbia, Mr Salontaji-Drobnjak’s exclusion from the proceedings meant that he 
had ‘been unable to personally challenge the experts' report recommending 
the partial deprivation of his legal capacity’. 93  The Court criticised the 
Municipal Court’s decision to exclude him from proceedings on the basis that 
his appearance in person would not have been ‘purposeful’; a hypothetical 
prediction that the Strasbourg Court considered ‘arbitrary’. 94  In Lashin v 
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Russia, the domestic court had excluded Mr Lashin from deprivation of legal 
capacity proceedings on the basis this would be prejudicial to his health, yet 
without seeking a doctor’s opinion on that particular question. The Court 
commented that ‘a simple assumption that a person suffering from 
schizophrenia must be excluded from the proceedings is not sufficient’.95 In 
Zagidulina v Russia,96 a case concerning an appeal against deprivation of 
liberty for medical treatment, the Court found that ‘the applicant’s clear and 
undisputed refusal to undergo any treatment’ meant that the need to ensure 
her right to be heard ‘was ever more pressing’.97 
The rule of personal presence is, however, not absolute – even for 
proceedings concerning deprivation of legal capacity. In Berková v Slovakia, 
the domestic court had refused to hear Mrs Berková in person, in proceedings 
concerning the restoration of her capacity, and she was not notified of the 
court’s judgment and so could not appeal against it.98 The District Court heard 
evidence from a medical expert in person, the guardian appointed to Mrs 
Berková and a representative of the local authority, but not Mrs Berková 
herself. This, the Strasbourg Court concluded, was ‘sufficient evidence with a 
view to reliably establishing the facts and correctly determining the point in 
issue,’ and held that there were appropriate procedural guarantees to protect 
Mrs Berková’s rights and interests.99 
It is difficult to reconcile the reasoning in Berková v Slovakia with the other 
cases outlined above. In Shtukaturov v Russia, Salontaji-Drobnjak v Serbia, X 
and Y v Croatia, Sýkora v the Czech Republic and Lashin v Russia the Court 
emphasized the importance of the judge having personal contact with the 
person at the heart of deprivation of legal capacity and deprivation of liberty 
proceedings to enable them to form their own view. This was regarded as a 
vital safeguard against over-reliance on medical evidence, which would lead 
to excessive arbitrariness. It is also unclear why Mrs Berková’s treatment, 
unlike Mr Shtukaturov’s, was not unreasonable and in breach of the principle 
of adversarial proceedings enshrined in Article 6 as the decision there was 
also based on documentary evidence without seeing or hearing the applicant. 
One possible basis for distinguishing Mrs Berková’s case from that of Mr 
Lashin and Mr Salontaji-Drobjnak may be that there was medical evidence 
which advised against serving judgments upon her and her attending court.100  
Yet given that a key reason underpinning the rule of personal presence is the 
need to reduce the arbitrariness of overreliance on medical evidence, this 
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seems a problematic basis for departing from it. Another possible 
distinguishing feature of Mrs Berková’s case is that the Prosecutor General 
did appeal the judgment of the District Court on her behalf101 – but again it is 
hard to see how this could act as a safeguard against faith in an arbitrary 
medical opinion, if the appellate court did not hear from Mrs Berková either.  
Unhappily, the Strasbourg Court does not elaborate, and this idiosyncratic 
ruling injects an unfortunate element of uncertainty into what otherwise looked 
like a positive, albeit gradual, progression away from denial of equal rights to 
participate in legal proceedings concerning the fundamental rights of people 
with disabilities. 
4.3. LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
Article 6 ECHR does not merely guarantee access to a court, but a right of 
effective access to a court.102 In Airey v Ireland the European Court noted that 
effective access to a court could be guaranteed by a range of measures, 
including through the simplification of the domestic procedure. However, as 
this case involved complicated points of law, expert evidence, the examination 
of witnesses and an ‘emotional involvement that is scarcely compatible with 
the degree of objectivity required by advocacy in court’, the court held that the 
possibility to appear in person ‘does not provide the applicant with an effective 
right of access’. 103  In circumstances where legal representation is 
‘indispensable for an effective access to court’, the Court held, Article 6 will 
compel States to provide for the assistance of a lawyer. In MS v Croatia, in 
finding a violation of Article 6 in relation to deprivation of legal capacity 
proceedings, the Court was ‘mindful’ that national law did not provide for 
obligatory legal representation, ‘despite the very serious nature of the issues 
concerned and the possible consequences of such proceedings’.   
The Court has held that failure to appoint a lawyer may also violate other 
ECHR rights. In AK and L v Croatia,104 failure to provide a lawyer to a woman 
who was ‘intellectually incapable of following the court proceedings for 
divesting her of her parental rights or understanding the true nature of those 
proceedings, let alone arguing her case’ was found to violate her Article 8 
rights. In Megyeri v Germany105 the Court found a violation of Article 5(4) 
when the German courts failed to assign counsel to a man who was appealing 
against his detention for criminal offences for which ‘he could not be held 
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responsible because he was suffering from a schizophrenic psychosis with 
signs of paranoia’.106 The Court felt that it was doubtful that Mr Megyeri, 
acting on his own, would be able ‘to marshal and present adequately points in 
his favour on this issue, involving as it did matters of medical knowledge and 
expertise’, or to address the legal issues around the proportionality of his 
continued detention.107 This violated his Article 5(4) rights even though Mr 
Megyeri had not specifically requested such assistance himself. 108  This 
principle was affirmed in Magalhaes Pereira v Portugal.109  
4.4. THE ROLE OF LITIGATION GUARDIANS  
For those deprived of their legal capacity, however, issues may arise as to 
who should instruct their legal representative – the person themselves, or 
some kind of a guardian. In DD v Lithuania, the Court held that it was 
inappropriate that DD and her guardian both be represented by the same 
lawyer in proceedings which DD herself had initiated to request that her 
current guardian be replaced by her former guardian, who had become her 
friend. The Court noted that being under guardianship ‘does not mean that he 
is incapable of expressing a view on his situation and thus of coming into 
conflict with the guardian’.110 The complexity of the legal issues and DD’s 
‘history of psychiatric troubles’ meant that it was necessary to provide her with 
a lawyer,111 yet the guardian’s own lawyer could not represent DD because 
her interests conflicted with her guardian’s.112  Thus under the ECHR, where 
the substance of the matter being litigated is the conflict between a person 
and their guardian, the person should be entitled to independent 
representation. 
The ruling in DD focussed on who should represent DD’s interests; a term that 
has loaded implications for people deprived of legal capacity. Where 
representation in legal proceedings focuses on a person’s interests, a 
question arises as to who decides what a person’s interests are: the person 
themselves, or some third party? Many jurisdictions provide for some form of 
representation of the interests of people deprived of legal capacity – or in 
proceedings which will determine their legal capacity – where those interests 
are to be determined by somebody other than the person themselves.113 One 
of the best known forms this kind of representation takes is the use of 
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guardians ad litem – sometimes known as ‘litigation guardians’, ‘litigation 
friends’ or ‘next friends’.114 In what follows, I use the term ‘litigation guardian’ 
to refer to a person who is appointed to represent a person’s interests in legal 
proceedings – either directly, or through a lawyer – but who is not necessarily 
their guardian in relation to other matters. However, other kinds of litigation 
guardians exist – such as ‘temporary guardians’ in Serbian guardianship 
proceedings,115 or the new proposed role of ‘Court Friends’ in Ireland.116 
In many jurisdictions the role of litigation guardians has evolved over time and 
may not be clearly defined in any statute or rules. Sometimes a family 
member or a friend may act as a litigation guardian, sometimes there may be 
provision for a professional of some kind to take on that role where friends or 
family members are unavailable or inappropriate. For example, in England 
and Wales the Official Solicitor acts as a ‘litigation friend of last resort’ for 
several thousand people in a wide range of litigation – from cases directly 
concerned with legal capacity, to other kinds of civil litigation such as 
bankruptcy, divorce, or judicial reviews.117 In some jurisdictions, staff of Social 
Welfare Centres may act as litigation guardians.118   
Litigation guardians have been identified by the European Court as an 
important protection measure. For example, in B. v Romania (No. 2),119 the 
failure to appoint a litigation guardian for a woman who had been ‘committed’ 
to a psychiatric institution and whose children had been removed from her 
care, was found to have violated her Article 8 rights. Mirroring this line of 
reasoning, a series of cases from England and Wales have found that 
solicitors taking instructions from people who ‘lack capacity’ to make decisions 
about litigation, resulting in their settling claims for a lower value than they 
might have been entitled to, could be negligent.120 Importantly, these cases 
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have been brought by people with disabilities themselves, arguing that they 
should have been appointed a litigation guardian to assist them in bringing or 
defending proceedings, or to prevent them from disadvantageous settlements.   
The role of litigation guardian can, however, become problematic where a 
dispute arises between the litigation guardian and the person they represent 
regarding what outcome or remedy should be sought, and how and when 
cases may be settled. In such circumstances, it is possible that a litigation 
guardian may argue a case that supports a measure which the person 
themselves opposes, or may at least refuse to oppose a measure. Two 
examples from England and Wales, one of which went on to be considered by 
the European Court, illustrate this powerfully.   
In the case Re E (Medical treatment: Anorexia) (Rev 1),121 a woman with 
anorexia nervosa refused any refeeding treatment and wanted to be allowed 
to ‘die with dignity’. She had made two advance directives (with the 
assistance of a solicitor, her mother and an advocate) to that effect. Yet her 
own legal representatives, instructed by a litigation friend, argued that she 
‘lacked capacity’ to make this decision and that it was in her best interests to 
undergo forcible feeding treatment, which was estimated to give her only a 
20% chance of recovery. As barrister Barbara Hewson noted ‘the only people 
arguing for Ms E to be left alone were her parents, who did not have legal 
representation’.122 In many cases – like that of Dr A, an Iranian asylum seeker 
staging a hunger strike, whom the court ordered be forcibly fed123 – a person 
may not even have family arguing against any measure they oppose.   
In another case, a local authority sought a care order to remove the baby (KP) 
of a young mother with intellectual disabilities (RP) from her care. RP’s 
solicitor felt that she lacked the ‘capacity to litigate’, and so the Official 
Solicitor was appointed as her litigation friend to instruct her solicitor on her 
behalf. The Official Solicitor did not oppose the making of the care order in 
light of the evidence, and so there was never a hearing where RP’s legal 
representatives contested this evidence and argued against the order. RP 
brought a case before the Court of Appeal, where she argued that her Article 
6 ECHR rights were infringed – the first time the role of litigation guardians 
and Article 6 had been considered in the domestic courts.124 The Court of 
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Appeal found that her rights had not been infringed, and the case continued to 
the European Court as RP v UK.125   
The European Court considered RP’s claim that her Article 6 and Article 14 
rights had been violated because ‘she was denied the right to challenge the 
removal of K.P. from her care on account of her disability’. 126  The Court 
accepted the UK government’s argument that ‘Acting in R.P.’s best interests 
did not entail advancing whatever case R.P. wanted to advance, however 
unarguable’.127 Somewhat surprisingly the Strasbourg Court invoked Article 
13 CRPD (on access to justice) in support of its reasoning: 
[. . . ] bearing in mind the requirement in the UN Convention that 
State parties provide appropriate accommodation to facilitate 
disabled persons’ effective role in legal proceedings, the Court 
considers that it was not only appropriate but also necessary for 
the United Kingdom to take measures to ensure that R.P.’s best 
interests were represented in the childcare proceedings. Indeed, 
in view of its existing case-law the Court considers that a failure 
to take measures to protect R.P.’s interests might in itself have 
amounted to a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.128 
The Court did, however, hold that ‘in order to safeguard R.P.’s rights under 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, it was imperative that a means existed 
whereby it was possible for her to challenge the Official Solicitor’s 
appointment or the continuing need for his services’.129   
Despite the European Court’s reliance on the CRPD to arrive at this 
conclusion, it is clearly at odds with the jurisprudence of the CRPD Committee 
as it endorsed the role of litigation guardians as substituted decision makers 
for persons deprived of their capacity to litigate. In relation to Article 13 CRPD 
the Committee has expressed concern about ‘patronizing measures . . . such 
as the designation of public defenders that treat the person concerned as if 
they lacked legal capacity’. The Court did not consider the distinction between 
support for litigation and other consensual accommodations, and measures 
that amount to substituted decision making. Neither did the Court consider the 
accessibility of the one remedy which remained available to RP – to challenge 
the appointment of her litigation guardian. If RP did require support to conduct 
litigation and understand her rights, it is problematic to expect that she, acting 
upon her own initiative, would have been in a position to initiate litigation or a 
complaint to displace her litigation guardian - the Official Solicitor. This is 
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especially the case when she may not have appreciated the implications of 
his appointment for opposing the care order.130 In short, it is questionable 
whether this right to appeal against the appointment of a litigation guardian is 
a ‘practical and effective’ safeguard for Article 6 rights, and not merely 
‘theoretical and illusory’. 131 
Litigation guardians, the adversarial principle and equality of arms 
Even under the ECHR’s own jurisprudence, the ruling in RP v UK is 
problematic. At the heart of Article 6 lies the ‘adversarial principle’ and the 
principle of equality of arms. 132  The adversarial principle under Article 6 
relates to having the opportunity to know and comment on the evidence and 
observations of other parties during a trial, whilst equality of arms means that 
each party must have a reasonable opportunity to present their case in 
conditions which do not place them at a substantial disadvantage. 133  Yet 
despite RP being able to articulate clearly that her case was that she wished 
to care for her child, and E being able to articulate clearly that she did not 
want to be forcibly fed, neither RP nor E had the opportunity to put their case 
to the Court nor test the evidence against their case. It is true that their legal 
representatives conveyed their views to the Court, but when they either 
refused to advocate for that case, or even argued for the opposite of their 
client’s view, this scarcely seems capable of delivering the guarantees of 
adversarial justice and equality of arms. Where the very purpose of the 
litigation is to determine the question of a person’s legal capacity, as in the 
case of Ms E, or another matter engaging a person’s fundamental rights, such 
as the removal of their child from their care or appealing against a deprivation 
of liberty, it is inherently problematic that the person’s own representative may 
not contest the evidence and arguments in favour of the measure the person 
themselves oppose. It is difficult to see how the court can then act as a 
safeguard against arbitrary decisions reached on the basis of that evidence, 
or take into account all the arguments in favour of protecting a person from an 
interference with their rights.  Moreover, where a litigation guardian may 
refuse to bring, or may choose to settle or withdraw without a hearing on the 
merits, a person’s appeal against detention, it is difficult to see how this would 
not fall afoul of the court’s general jurisprudence that access to an Article 5(4) 
remedy should not depend upon the discretion of third parties.134 
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͚IŶarguaďle Đases͛ aŶd fuŶdaŵeŶtal rights 
In both the domestic and European Court hearings of RP v UK the 
Government argued that a litigation guardian could not be expected to put 
forward an unarguable case. Disappointingly the European Court never 
questioned whether RP might have had an arguable case that her child 
should not be removed from her care. The existence of an arguable right in 
domestic law is a precondition for Article 6 ECHR to be engaged,135 but there 
is a logical difference between a case being arguable and a case having 
strong prospects of success. This has been explicitly recognized in English 
law, where a court observed that there was a difference – albeit that it could 
be difficult to draw that line – between ‘an argument which can properly be 
articulated and put forward (but which has little, if any, prospect of success) 
and an argument which cannot properly be articulated and which is believed 
to be bound to fail’.136 The European Court has not stated this in quite such 
clear terms. However, in a case concerning the right to an oral hearing to 
review the lawfulness of detention, the Court emphasized that ‘Article 5(4) is 
first and foremost a guarantee of a fair procedure for reviewing the lawfulness 
of detention – an applicant is not required, as a precondition to enjoying that 
protection, to show that on the facts of his case he stands any particular 
chance of success in obtaining his release’.137  Arguably similar reasoning 
should attach to the right to put forward cases which may have slim prospects 
of success in relation to other fundamental rights, such as deprivation of legal 
capacity or removal of one’s child from one’s care, as what is at stake is of 
similar significance to loss of liberty and requires equivalent guarantees of a 
fair procedure. 
Since the ruling in RP v UK the Court has briefly revisited the role of litigation 
guardians. In MS v Croatia a guardian ad litem was appointed from the staff of 
the self-same Social Welfare Centre who applied to a court to deprive MS of 
her legal capacity. The Court commented that ‘given that it was the Centre 
itself that had instituted the proceedings for divesting the applicant of her legal 
capacity, it would be difficult to expect an employee of that same Centre to 
oppose or challenge such a request’.138  It is clear that, at minimum, the 
European Court takes a dim view of the appointment of people with a clear 
conflict of interest as a potential litigation guardian. The litigation guardian 
must at least be capable of opposing or challenging such a measure as 
deprivation of legal capacity. What is less clear is when they must do so. The 
listed forthcoming case of Ivinović v Croatia, which has a similar fact pattern 
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to MS v Croatia, may present an opportunity for the Court to revisit the 
question of whether a person’s legal representative must assist them in 
effectively opposing such a drastic interference with their rights as deprivation 
of legal capacity. 
5. SUPPORT AND ACCOMMODATIONS 
Article 12(3) CRPD requires States to ‘take appropriate measures to provide 
access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity’. Clearly, the conduct of litigation is one 
possible exercise of legal capacity, and many people with disabilities – not 
solely those with intellectual, cognitive or psychosocial disabilities – may 
require support or assistance in understanding and making decisions about 
the litigation, or even navigating practical barriers such as completing 
paperwork, accessing information or the courtroom itself. Article 13 CRPD 
requires States to ‘ensure effective access to justice for persons with 
disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the provision of 
procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their 
effective role as direct and indirect participants’.   
The European Court has for some time acknowledged that people with 
disabilities may require additional supports or accommodations to assist them 
in the conduct of legal proceedings. In Winterwerp v the Netherlands139 it held 
that ‘special procedural safeguards may prove called for in order to protect the 
interests of persons who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not fully 
capable of acting for themselves’. This principle has been reiterated in many 
subsequent cases.140 As noted earlier, the Court’s emphasis on the protection 
of interests has led to a paternalistic approach to the accommodations and 
supports people with disabilities may need in exercising their legal capacity in 
litigation and accessing justice. European rulings which have found that 
persons were not able to access the necessary assistance to understand, and 
conduct, legal proceedings have seemed to have in view guardians, or 
litigation guardians, as the only available alternative. 141  Yet models of 
supported decision making being developed in relation to Article 12(3) create 
the potential for support and assistance to enable people to make effective 
use of their access to justice without the use of substituted decision makers 
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who may run a person’s case in a way which conflicts with their will and 
preferences. 
One example of such supports comes from the Republic of Ireland. Following 
a settled case142 where the Irish Human Rights Commission had challenged 
the refusal of the Legal Aid Board to fund a guardian ad litem to support a 
parent with intellectual disabilities who was involved in child care proceedings, 
the role of a support person to assist a person with litigation, but who was not 
a litigation guardian, was conceived. The Irish Human Rights Commission had 
argued that it was necessary to provide some support to help the parent 
understand the implications of the litigation and give instructions to their 
solicitor. However, they had relied upon Article 12 CRPD to argue that the role 
of guardians ad litem should be reconfigured; rather than representing the 
adult’s ‘best interests’, as they would for a child, they should: 
[. . . ] bring his or her skills to bear in order to determine the 
wishes and instructions of the adult party and to relay same to 
the Court. Thus, the Guardian ad Litem must advocate on behalf 
of the adult in a manner which respects the dignity of the adult 
and which best vindicates the party’s right of effective access to 
the Court.143 
It was acknowledged that in some cases it may not be possible to glean 
instructions from a person with a severe communication difficulty, in which 
case their role would be limited to informing ‘the Court of the steps that have 
been taken in order to ascertain the views of the person in question and 
thereafter to indicate what he or she perceives to be in that person’s best 
interests.'144 
In settling the case, the Legal Aid Board adopted a circular,145 which created a 
new role of a person to assist ‘clients of impaired capacity’ in child care 
proceedings. The role of the assistant would be to: 
- to explain to the client the nature of the proceedings and the potential 
outcomes; 
- to relay information from the solicitor to the client and from the client to 
the solicitor; 
- to attend the court with the client when it is considered essential by the 
solicitor; and 
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- to discuss with the client the options that might be available and to 
assist the client give instructions to the solicitor in relation to those 
options.146 
It envisaged that the person ‘would sit in on at least some consultations with 
the client’ in order to perform their functions effectively. This provision did not 
go so far as to challenge the continuing role of litigation guardians in 
representing a person’s ‘interests,’ but it does at least provide a useful 
indication of the direction of travel which Article 12 CRPD could, and should, 
take us towards fulfilling the procedural legal rights of persons with disabilities.  
This is an area ripe for creative litigation by disability rights lawyers, and this 
example from Ireland may represent the beginnings of a new European trend. 
In addition to providing supports for a particular person under Article 12(3) 
CRPD, Article 13 CRPD is an important reminder that the legal system itself 
should make appropriate accommodations to facilitate effective access to 
justice for people with disabilities – including by promoting appropriate training 
for those working in the justice system. The CRPD is founded upon a social 
model of disability, 147  which recognizes that disability arises ‘from the 
interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and 
environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participation in 
society on an equal basis with others’.148 Difficulties people with disabilities 
may experience in navigating the justice system, including understanding the 
litigation and giving instructions to their representatives, should also be 
understood in terms of the failure of the legal system to adapt to their needs.  
It is important to consider how adequate the knowledge and skills of legal 
professionals are for ensuring effective access to justice for people with 
disabilities, rather than solely relying on the provision of specialist supports or 
– worse – labelling people as ‘incapable’ of navigating litigation and 
appointing litigation guardians to do so on their behalf. To date, the European 
Court has paid little attention to how far disability occurs because of the 
failings of the machinery of justice itself. It has not considered the legal 
system’s own ‘incapacity’ to adapt its rules, procedures and its material 
incarnation, to accommodate and enable access to justice for citizens with 
disabilities. This, too, is an important area for future litigation, campaigning 
and research. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
Looking to the general trend towards stronger procedural rights for those 
deprived of their legal capacity, the significance of rulings like Stanev is that, 
slowly, the appointment and acts of substituted decision makers are being 
brought within the realm of the rule of law. The days of courts appointing 
guardians, and guardians making decisions, without any realistic prospect of 
challenge from those affected by them are increasingly numbered. This is by 
no means sufficient to comply with the CRPD’s call for the replacement of 
regimes of substituted decision making with supported decision making. Yet 
this overlay of the rule of law for guardianship regimes may pose a much 
more existential challenge to their existence than at first appears. At its core, 
guardianship exists as a mechanism to override a person’s preferred choices; 
if we are to take seriously their right to oppose such measures in a court, with 
full procedural rights, then the volume of litigation could be very large indeed.  
One can imagine courts becoming overwhelmed, and guardianship regimes 
effectively grinding to a halt as each decision that conflicts with a person’s 
wishes and preferences must be adjudicated by a court. 
In fact, it is not hard to see how this might threaten the entire foundations of 
guardianship, and why guardianship and a denial of access to the courts have 
for long so gone hand in hand. Yet the European Convention, as the 
Strasbourg Court so often proclaims,149 is built upon the rule of law, and it 
would be unacceptable to row back this tide and condemn people with 
disabilities to the despotic world of arbitrary interferences with their 
fundamental rights. Progress in even this most modest area of legal capacity 
reform – procedural justice – may yet shake guardianship paradigms to their 
core.  
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